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Belief bias and representation in assessing the Bayesian rationality of
others
Richard B. Anderson∗ Laura Marie Leventhal† Don C. Zhang‡ Daniel Fasko, Jr.§
Zachariah Basehore¶ Christopher Gamsby¶ Jared Branch¶ Timothy Patrick¶
Abstract
People often assess the reasonableness of another person’s judgments. When doing so, the evaluator should set aside
knowledge that would not have been available to the evaluatee to assess whether the evaluatee made a reasonable decision,
given the available information. But under what circumstances does the evaluator set aside information? On the one hand, if
the evaluator fails to set aside prior information, not available to the evaluatee, they exhibit belief bias. But on the other hand,
when Bayesian inference is called for, the evaluator should generally incorporate prior knowledge about relevant probabilities
in decision making. The present research integrated these two perspectives in two experiments. Participants were asked to take
the perspective of a fictitious evaluatee and to evaluate the reasonableness of the evaluatee’s decision. The participant was privy
to information that the fictitious evaluatee did not have. Specifically, the participant knew whether the evaluatee’s decision
judgment was factually correct. Participants’ judgments were biased (Experiments 1 and 2) by the factuality of the conclusion
as they assessed the evaluatee’s reasonableness. We also found that the format of information presentation (Experiment 2)
influenced the degree to which participants’ reasonableness ratings were responsive to the evaluatee’s Bayesian rationality.
Specifically, responsivity was greater when the information was presented in an icon-based, graphical, natural-frequency
format than when presented in either a numerical natural-frequency format or a probability format. We interpreted the effects
of format to suggest that graphical presentation can help organize information into nested sets, which in turn enhances Bayesian
rationality.
Keywords: belief bias, reasoning, Bayesian inference, rationality, counterfactual
1 Introduction
People often need to assess the reasonableness of another
person’s judgments. For example, one might assess whether
a physician, a set of jurors, a referee for a journal, or a po-
litical leader has given proper consideration to all data that
were available at the time of a crucial decision. In such
situations, the evaluator should set aside any knowledge he
or she may have that was not available to the evaluatee (the
person being evaluated), and assess whether the evaluatee
made a reasonable decision. Thus, while there is a general
Bayesian requirement (Bayes, 1763; Eddy, 1982; Peterson
&Miller, 1965) judgments be made on the basis of complete
rather than incomplete prior knowledge, the set of relevant
information should include only that which the evaluatee is
in a position to know. Though past research has examined
Copyright: © 2019. The authors license this article under the terms of
the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.
∗Department of Psychology, Bowling Green State University, Bowling
Green, Ohio 43403. Email: randers@bgsu.edu
†Computer Science Department, The University of Findlay.
‡Louisiana State University, Department of Psychology.
§School of Educational Foundations, Leadership, and Policy, Bowling
Green State University.
¶Department of Psychology, Bowling Green State University.
the improper neglect of prior information in judgments (e.g.,
base-rate neglect), no research has explored the degree to
which people correctly ignore prior information when judg-
ing the rationality of others. In the present paper, we explore
the factors that are in play as the evaluator considers the
decisions of the evaluatee. Three phenomena of interest are
(1) belief bias, (2) the potential for counterfactuality to en-
hance discriminability, and (3) the sub-optimal combination
of relevant probability information (for example, base-rate
neglect).
1.1 Failure to consider all relevant probabili-
ties: Base rate neglect
In Bayesian judgment tasks, people often fail to adequately
consider prior probabilities (i.e., base-rates — Bar-Hillel,
1980; Eddy, 1982; Sloman, Over, Slovak & Stibel, 2003;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). For example, suppose the
outcome of a particularmedical diagnostic test, with a known
accuracy rate, indicates that a patient has Disease A. Under
such conditions, research participants do consider the test’s
accuracy, but they do not give adequate consideration to the
prior probability of having the disease. That is they neglect to
properly consider what the probability of having the disease
would be, prior to knowing the test’s outcome. The value of
1
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 14, No. 1, January 2019 Assessing the Bayesian rationality of others 2
this prior probability depends on the disease’s base rate —
i.e., its prevalence within the population.
Because base-rate neglect (or generally, prior-probability
neglect) is well-established within the literature, one would
expect it to replicate in situations, such as the present stud-
ies, wherein an evaluator assesses the reasonableness of an
evaluatee’s probability judgments. Such replication is not
guaranteed, however, since a number of factors, to be re-
viewed in a later section, can influence the magnitude of
base-rate neglect.
1.2 Knowing that someone’s prediction has
been falsified by an outcome
Will an evaluator’s judgment of reasonableness be biased
by knowledge that the evaluatee has made a counterfactual
judgment? A number of studies have examined situations in
which an evaluator is aware of a valenced outcome (one that
is favorable or unfavorable) that could not have been known
by evaluate, at the time the evaluatee made his or her judg-
ment (Baron & Hershey, 1988; Savani & King, 2015; Sezer,
Zhang, Gino & Bazerman, 2016). Succinctly, “People view
the same decision as better when it is followed by a positive
outcome than by a negative outcome, a phenomenon called
the outcome bias” (Sezer et al., 2016, p. 1). For example, a
surgeon’s decision to operate seems more reasonable when
the evaluator knows the surgery succeeded than when it is
known to have failed (Baron & Hershey, 1988).
However, it is not known whether mere knowledge that
an evalatee’s judgment has turned out to be correct or in-
correct (as opposed to knowing the positivity/negativity of
a judgment’s impact) is enough to bias an evaluator. Sug-
gestive evidence comes from research on people’s ability to
reason logically about syllogisms: In a phenomenon termed
belief bias, people judge an argument to be less valid when
they have a prior belief in the falsity of the argument’s con-
clusion (e.g., Dube, Rotello & Heit, 2010; Evans, Handley
& Harper, 2001; Newstead, Pollard, Evans & Allen, 1992;
Trippas, Handley & Verde, 2013). It may be that an anal-
ogous effect occurs with respect to judgments that involve
probabilities. That is, an evaluator’s knowledge that the eval-
uatee’s conclusion, prediction, or diagnosis is counterfactual
may bias the evaluator to think the evaluatee’s judgment was
unreasonable.
Distinct from outcome bias is the phenomenon wherein a
person’s knowledge of the occurrence of a particular event
can cause that person to either overestimate the extent to
which he or she could have successfully predicted the event,
or to falsely remember the he or she made a correct predic-
tion (this is “hindsight bias;” see Pohl, 2017, for a review).
However, it is not known whether knowledge of an event’s
occurrence has the additional effect of making those who
lack such knowledge — through no fault of their own —
appear unreasonable.
1.3 Summary, and overview of the present
studies
On each trial of the two experiments in the present paper, a
fictitious evaluatee made a diagnosis that was either Bayes
consistent (i.e., that took base rates into account), or that
was Bayes inconsistent (i.e., that neglected the base rates).
Additionally, the diagnosis was either factual (it was a cor-
rect match to reality) or counterfactual (it was incorrect).
We sought to address the following questions raised in the
literature review.
Are evaluators’ judgments of reasonableness responsive to
the evaluatee’s use or non-use of base rates? Weattempted to
answer this question by manipulating the Bayes consistency
(consistent or inconsistent) of the evaluatee’s judgment, and
by measuring the evaluator’s rating of the reasonableness of
the evaluatee’s judgment.
Are evaluators’ judgments of reasonableness biased in the
sense that they are responsive to the factuality (factual vs.
counterfactual) of the evaluatee’s judgment? To answer this
question, we manipulated the factuality of an evaluatee’s
judgment, and we measured the evaluators’ rating of the
evaluatee’s reasonableness.
When an evaluator knows that the evaluatee has made a
counterfactual diagnosis, does such knowledge help the eval-
uator discriminate objectively reasonable predictions (on
the part of the evaluatee) from unreasonable ones? We ad-
dressed this question by assessing whether the evaluators’
ratings of reasonableness were responsive to the evaluatees’
Bayes consistency, and (b) whether there was an interaction
with factuality such that responsiveness was greater when
the evaluatee’s diagnosis was counterfactual than when it
was factual.
We also investigated the potential effects of information
format (probability, versus numerical natural frequency, ver-
sus graphical natural frequency), but we defer discussion of
that factor until later in the paper, since it is only relevant to
Experiment 2.
2 Experiment 1
The participant played the role of an evaluator, assessing the
reasonableness of the judgment of a fictitious physician who
has diagnosed a woman as being pregnant with a single fetus
or with twins. The diagnosis was either Bayes consistent (in
that it was consistent with the provided base rates for single-
fetus versus twin pregnancies) or Bayes inconsistent, and
was either factual (i.e., a correct assessment of the woman’s
actual pregnancy status), or counterfactual. We expected
these independent variables to have main effects as well as
interactive effects.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the procedure for a single trial. In
this example, the diagnosis is counterfactual because it does
not match the pregnancy’s actual status. Additionally, the
diagnosis of “single fetus” is Bayes-consistent because it is
consistent with the expressed base rates (which are so ex-
treme that they overwhelm the test’s diagnostic accuracy).
We combined the results of the yes/no and the certainty rat-
ing to compute a reasonableness rating. The independent
variables (IV) are the Bayes-consistency and factuality of the
diagnosis. Note that the information about actual status is
irrelevant to the judgment of reasonableness. In this exam-
ple, the probability that the test result is correct, given the
evidence, is 0.11.
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants
The participants (N = 98; 67 women) were undergradu-
ate psychology students at Bowling Green State University.
They ranged in age from18 to 27 (mean of 19.2). They volun-
teered by selecting the study from a list of studies advertised
on a web page designed for recruiting Bowling Green State
University students. The experiment was conducted via the
internet, and was implemented using Qualtrics. Participants
received credit toward their course requirements in exchange
for their participation.
2.1.2 Design
The experiment was a 2 by 2 within-participant fac-
torial. One independent variable was the factual-
ity/counterfactuality of the physician’s conclusion. (A fac-
tual conclusion was a diagnosis that matched the woman’s
actual status; otherwise the conclusion was counterfactual.)
A second independent variable was the Bayes-consistency of
the physician’s diagnosis: Given the pregnancy test result,
together with the base rates for the two kinds of pregnancy
(single or twin fetuses), the conclusion (the diagnosis) was
either Bayes-consistent (i.e., consistent with the conclusion
prescribed by Bayes theorem), or it was Bayes-inconsistent.
Thus, we manipulated Bayes-consistency independently of
factuality/counterfactuality. To avoid exact repetition of trial
content, the accuracy-percentage for the diagnostic test also
varied slightly across trials (70% or 75%), as did the base
rates. For single-fetus and twin pregnancies, respectively,
the base rates were either 90% and 10%, or 95% and 5%).
All variations in trial content, and all manipulations, were
within-participant.
In each trial, the participant’s response was a yes/no judg-
ment of the reasonableness of a medical diagnosis, along
with a confidence rating for the yes/no judgment. Figure 1
illustrates a single trial. Table 1 indicates the content of the
32 trials, which were randomly ordered for each participant.
2.1.3 Procedure
Each participant performed 32 trials of a medical judgment
task (Figure 1) wherein participants rated the reasonableness
of a physician who has access to base rates, along with
a diagnostic test, to assess whether a pregnant woman is
carrying a single fetus or twins. The order of the trials was
randomized separately for each participant. As indicated in
Figure 1, each trial included information about base rates,
the expected accuracy of the test, and the factuality of the
physician’s diagnosis.
2.2 Results
Each assessment of reasonableness was converted to an
eight-point scale ranging from −4 (very certain "no") to
+4 (very certain "yes"), by combining the yes/no and rating
scale assessments shown in Figure 1.
To assess whether the data might be compatible with a
signal detection model, we examined ROC curves defined
as the hit rate as a function of the false alarm rate (see
Macmillan & Creelman, 2005, for a description of signal
detectionmodeling). However, we found that the curveswere
asymmetrical, thus violating the signal detection analysis
prerequisite that each curve be symmetrical. Consequently,
we do not report signal detection analyses in the present
paper.
As shown in Figure 2, an analysis of variance (ANOVA)
produced an expectedmain effect of theBayes-consistency of
the of the diagnosis (made by the fictitious physician) on par-
ticipants’ reasonableness ratings [F(1, 97) = 30.53, p < .001,
η
2
p
= .24]. The figure also shows a main effect of factuality
on participants’ reasonableness ratings [F(1, 97) = 73.34,
p < .001, η2
p
= .43]. Additionally there was an interactive
effect of Bayes-consistency and factuality on participants’
reasonableness ratings: The effect of Bayes consistency on
the mean rating was greater in the counterfactual condition
than in the factual condition [F(1, 97) = 7.37, p = .008, η2
p
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Table 1: Stimulus-Set Structure for Experiment 1.
Trial ID Base Rates
(Single Fetus;
Twins)
Test Accuracy
(Single Fetus;
Twins)
Test Result Conclusion
(diagnosis)
Actual Status Bayes-
Consistency of
Diagnosis (IV)
Factuality of
Diagnosis
(IV)
1 90%; 10% 70%; 70% O O O consistent factual
2 90%; 10% 70%; 70% T O O consistent factual
3 90%; 10% 70%; 70% O T T inconsistent factual
4 90%; 10% 70%; 70% T T T inconsistent factual
5 90%; 10% 70%; 70% O O T consistent counterfactual
6 90%; 10% 70%; 70% T O T consistent counterfactual
7 90%; 10% 70%; 70% O T O inconsistent counterfactual
8 90%; 10% 70%; 70% T T O inconsistent counterfactual
. . .
Note. O = only one fetus, T = twins. IV indicates that the variable is an independent variable in the design. The stimuli
were designed so that a Bayes-consistent diagnosis was always “only one fetus” (given the extreme base rates favoring
“only one fetus"). The table includes only 8 of the 32 stimulus configurations. The remaining 24 configurations follow the
same pattern except that the Test Accuracy percentages were sometimes 75 and 75 instead of 70 and 70, and the base rate
percentages were sometimes 95 and 5 instead of 90 and 10. The design was evenly counterbalanced across the
aforementioned variable levels.
Figure 2: Experiment 1. Reasonableness ratings as a func-
tion of the Bayes-consistency and factuality of a physician’s
conclusion. N = 98.
= .07]. Because the interaction did not entail a change in
the effect’s direction it is possible (though not guaranteed)
that it occurred as an artifact of the particular scaling of the
dependent variable (see Wagenmakers, Krypotos, Criss &
Iverson, 2012, for a discussion of “removable” interactions).
We also analyzed participants’ binary assessments of rea-
sonableness (the yes/no judgments concerning whether the
doctor drew the most reasonable conclusion), since these as-
sessments were not weighted by the confidence judgments
and were therefore less complicated, conceptually, than the
rating scale data. Each binary assessment of “reasonable”
was scored as 1; each assessment of “unreasonable” was
scored as −1. For each participant and in each condition, we
calculated the mean value for the binary assessment. The
data pattern was similar to that obtained from the rating scale
data. There was a significant main effect of Bayes consis-
tency, a significant main effect of factuality, and a significant
interaction, ps < .005. For the factual conditions: M = .33
(95% CI [.24, .42]) in the Bayes-consistent condition, and M
= .17 (95%CI [.09, .25]) in the Bayes-inconsistent condition.
For the counterfactual conditions: M = .07 (95% CI [−.02,
.16]) for the Bayes-consistent condition, and M = −.23 (95%
CI [−.32, −.15]) for the Bayes-inconsistent condition.
Figure 3 shows two other indices of individual partici-
pants’ performance. The first was an index of the main
effect of the Bayes consistency of the stimulus problem on
the reasonableness rating. We calculated this by subtracting
each participant’s mean reasonableness rating in the Bayes
inconsistent condition from the participant’s mean reason-
ableness rating in the Bayes consistent condition. Second
was an index of the main effect of counterfactuality on the
reasonableness rating. We calculated this by subtracting the
participant’s mean reasonableness rating in the counterfac-
tual condition from the participant’s mean reasonableness
rating in the factual condition.
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Figure 3: Effect-indices computed for each participant in
Experiment 1.
2.3 Discussion
The present main effect of factuality on ratings of reason-
ableness — that is, the pattern of higher ratings for factual
than for counterfactual diagnoses (Figure 2)— demonstrates
that the belief bias, defined as the failure to exclude irrele-
vant information (e.g., Evans et al., 2001), can occur within
the context of Bayesian judgment. This is because any effect
of factuality (on any of our dependent measures) indicated
participants’ tendency to consider factuality (i.e., to let fac-
tuality impact their judgment) when they should not. The
interaction, in which the effect of Bayes-consistency on rated
reasonableness was greater for counterfactual than for fac-
tual diagnoses (Figure 2) was a weaker effect, and notably,
did not involve a change in the direction of the effect. Thus
it is possible that the interaction is a scaling artifact (see Wa-
genmakers, Krypotos, Criss & Iverson, 2012). The present
main effects of factuality and Bayes consistency demon-
strated limited rationality in the participants. In judging the
reasonableness of another (fictitious) person’s judgments,
participants were responsive to a relevant factor: the Bayes-
consistency of a fictitious person’s judgment. But they were
also responsive to an irrelevant factor: the factuality of such
fictitious judgments.
3 Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was an attempt to replicate the major findings
of Experiment 1, which were that people’s ratings of the
reasonableness of a judgment were responsive both to the
Bayes-consistency and the factuality of the judgment. As
will be discussed in the following section, information format
is known to affect performance on judgment and decision-
making tasks, often for reasons that are unclear. But an
important step in assessing the replicability of the effects
obtained in Experiment 1 is to attempt such replications
with multiple information formats.
Graphical visual aids can facilitate judgments of frequency
and of probability (Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2011, 2013,
Okan, Garcia-Retamero, Cokely & Maldonado, 2015). A
particular kind of visual aid known as an icon array has been
shown to reduce people’s tendency to neglect the denomina-
tor portion of a relative frequency (Garcia-Retamero, Galesic
& Gigerenzer, 2010). To illustrate this neglect: When told
that 98 out of 3500 people who took Drug X had a fatal re-
action, and 1 out of 10 who took Drug Y had a fatal reaction,
people’s assessments of the relative danger of the two drugs
do not sufficiently consider the 3500 and the 10. However,
there have not been clear, consistent findings showing that
the use of icon arrays, or other kinds of graphics, reduces
base rate neglect beyond that achieved by the use of a natural
frequency format. For example, Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer
(2001) found no advantage of graphical presentation over a
natural frequency format, and in the context of a training
study, Talboy and Schneider (2017) found no overall ad-
vantage of graphical over natural frequency format. Note,
however, that graphical training produced greater subsequent
facilitation on graphical problems than on natural frequency
problems, and likewise, natural frequency training produced
greater subsequent facilitation on natural frequency prob-
lems than on graphically presented problems.
Like Experiment 1, Experiment 2 required participants to
make judgments about the reasonableness of the conclusions
of a fictitious physician. However, Experiment 2 employed
multiple stimulus-presentation formats. In one condition, the
stimulus data were presented as probabilities (technically, as
percentages). In a second condition the stimuli were pre-
sented in a numerical natural-frequency format (indicating
the joint frequencies for the two possible test results and
the two possible pregnancy statuses). A third condition em-
ployed an icon-based, graphical, natural-frequency format.
Because prior research (e.g., Gigerenzer & Hoffman, 1995;
Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 2001; Sloman et al., 2003; Tal-
boy & Schneider, 2017) has implicated natural-frequency
formats as facilitators of Bayesian inference, a reasonable
expectation was that Experiment 2 would produce greater
sensitivity to Bayesian rationality, and less bias in the graph-
ical and numerical natural-frequency conditions than in the
probability condition. We did not have strong expectations
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 14, No. 1, January 2019 Assessing the Bayesian rationality of others 6
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
P
re
s
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
The summary information below indicates the typical
percentage of women experiencing each test result and
experiencing each type of pregnancy.
95% of pregnant women are pregnant with ONLY ONE fetus,
and
5% are pregnant with TWINS.
There is a TEST that indicates whether one or two fetuses
are present.
The test is accurate 70% of the time for the women who are
pregnant with only one fetus.
The test is accurate 70% of the time for the women who are
pregnant with twins.
Figure 4: Example of information presented to participants
in the probability condition, in Experiment 2.
concerning possible effects of icon-based, graphical presen-
tation, since prior research did not provide a strong basis for
such expectations.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants
One hundred forty-one participants (94 women) were re-
cruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Each was paid
$2.00. They participated via the internet, using a web
browser. Their ages ranged from 18 to 29 with a mean
of 18.9.
3.1.2 Design
The experimental design was like that of Experiment 1 ex-
cept that Experiment 2 included three stimulus-data formats
rather than just one. The three formats were: probability
(Figure 4), graphical natural-frequency (Figure 5), and nu-
merical natural-frequency (also Figure 5). Thus, the design
was a 3 by 2 by 2 factorial: Format (probability, numerical
natural-frequency, or graphical natural-frequency), varied
between subjects, factuality (factual or counterfactual), and
Bayes-consistency (consistent or inconsistent) varied within
subjects. As in Experiment 1, the dependent variable was
the rating of reasonableness.
3.1.3 Procedure
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of three data
format conditions (probability, numerical natural-frequency,
or graphical natural-frequency) illustrated in Figures 6 and 7.
Positioned below the data was information about the “actual
status,” “test result,” and “conclusion,” alongwith a response
scale: This was the same information and scale used in Ex-
periment 1. In addition to the 32 trial types used in Experi-
Figure 5: Example of information presented to participants
in the graphical natural-frequency and numerical natural-
frequency conditions in Experiment 2.
ment 1, the present procedure included four attentiveness-test
trials randomly interspersed throughout the trial sequence.
(Trial orderwas randomized, separately for each participant.)
On such trials the stimulus display excluded crucial infor-
mation. Specifically, it excluded information concerning the
test result, the actual status, and the physician’s conclusion.
In place of such information was an instruction to make a
specific set of responses, such as “Please answer ’No’ and
’Very Certain’ ”). Thus, each participant could receive an
attentiveness score (0 to 4) indicating the number of correct
responses to the attentiveness questions.
3.2 Results and discussion
As in Experiment 1, we conducted separate analyses for the
quantitative (8-point scale) reasonableness assessment and
the binary (yes/no) assessment. To facilitate visual compar-
ison of the results for the two analyses, a “yes” on the binary
scale was scored as a 4.0, and a “no” was scored as a −4.0.
Figure 6 shows the data pattern and Table 2 presents the
ANOVA results.
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Figure 6: Effects of factuality, Bayes-consistency (consis-
tent or inconsistent), and information format (probability, nu-
meric natural-frequency, or graphical natural-frequency) on
participants’ assessments of reasonableness. To facilitate
graphical comparisons of the data patterns for binary versus
quantitative (−4 to 4) scale data, each binary response value
is scored as +4 or −4).
Table 2 indicates there were significant main effects of a
conclusion’s Bayes-consistency, and its factuality, on the
mean assessment of reasonableness (whether the assess-
ments aremeasured on a binary or quantitative scale). Exper-
iment 2 therefore replicated principal aspects of the results of
Experiment 1: The present main effect of Bayes-consistency
indicates that people are sensitive to a fictitious decision-
makers’ Bayesian rationality, and the main effect of factual-
ity indicates a bias to consider irrelevant information — that
is, to consider factuality — in assessing the reasonableness
of the conclusion.
There were also two-way interactions in which the effect
of Bayes consistency varied significantly across the levels
of information format. Additionally, the effect of Bayes
consistency was greater for the graphical natural-frequency
format than for either the numeric natural-frequency format
or the probability format (Table 3).
Table 2: Analyses of variance: quantitative and binary as-
sessments of reasonableness of several measures.
ANOVA dependent variable η2p df F p
Bayes Consistency
Quantitative Response .243 1, 138 44.37 <.001
Binary Response .251 1, 138 46.24 <.001
Factuality
Quantitative Response .418 1, 138 98.99 <.001
Binary Response .349 1, 138 73.58 <.001
Format
Quantitative Response .013 2, 138 0.91 .404
Binary Response .008 2, 138 0.53 .589
Bayes Consistency by Factuality
Quantitative Response .003 1, 138 0.36 .550
Binary Response .002 1, 138 0.23 .632
Bayes Consistency by Factuality
Quantitative Response .097 2, 138 7.45 .001
Binary Response .092 2, 138 7.01 .001
Bayes Consistency by Format
Quantitative Response .006 2, 138 0.40 .670
Binary Response .003 2, 138 0.18 .836
Bayes Consistency by Factuality by Format
Quantitative Response .031 2, 138 2.18 .117
Binary Response .028 2, 138 1.95 .146
Table 3: Experiment 2. Supplemental analyses assessing
the interaction between format and Bayes consistency, with
only two levels of format in each analysis.
ANOVA dependent variable η2p df F p
Graphical Frequency vs. Probability
Quantitative Response .073 1, 97 7.67 .007
Binary Response .067 1, 97 6.98 .010
Graphical Frequency vs. Numerical Frequency
Quantitative Response .083 1, 102 9.25 .003
Binary Response .083 1, 102 9.29 .003
The number of participants receiving an attentiveness
score of 4.0, 3.0, 2.0, 1.0, or 0.0, was 75, 18, 15, 9, and
24, respectively. The large number of less-than-4.0 scores
raises the question of whether the observed data patterns are
evident at all levels of attentiveness. Though some of the
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Figure 7: Quantitative ratings of reasonableness as func-
tions of attentiveness score, factuality, Bayes-consistency
(consistent or inconsistent), and information format (prob-
ability, numeric natural-frequency, or graphical natural-
frequency).
cells sizes in Figure 8 are very small (in some cases, there is
only one observation in a cell), the data in Figure 7 suggested
that the pattern of the interaction between Bayes consistency
and format becomes progressively more evident as partici-
pants’ attentiveness to the task increases. (And note that for
participants achieving the maximum attentiveness score, the
interaction was significant, F(2 ,138) = 7.45, p = .001 , η2p
= .097). Additionally, Figure 8 shows the effect index values
for each participant.
Taken together, the results indicate that people were
most sensitive to Bayes consistency when the informa-
tion was presented in a graphical natural-frequency for-
mat. This facilitative effect is consistent with previous
research indicating that graphical representation can en-
hance probability-related judgments (e.g., Garcia-Retamero,
Galesic & Gigerenzer, 2010; Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 2001;
Okan, Garcia-Retamero, Cokely & Maldonado, 2015; Slo-
Figure 8: Effect-indices as a function of attentiveness score
(0 through 4) and presentation format (graphical frequency,
numerical frequency, probability), computed for each partici-
pant in Experiment 2.
man, Over, Slovak & Stibel, 2003).
In contrast to Experiment 1, Experiment 2 produced no
interaction between Bayes consistency and factuality, thus
providing no evidence to favor a selective scrutiny mecha-
nism — identified by Trippas et al. (2013) in the context of
syllogistic reasoning, wherein counterfactuality triggers ex-
tra scrutiny, which in turn triggers enhanced discrimination
between rational and irrational inferences.
4 General discussion
In the present set of studies, we used a Bayesian inference
task to investigate people’s perception of others’ rational-
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ity. In both studies, people showed some sensitivity to the
Bayes-consistency of another (fictitious) person’s conclu-
sions; the ratings of the reasonableness of such conclusions
were higher for Bayes-consistent than for Bayes-inconsistent
conclusions. We also found in Experiment 2 that sensitivity
was enhanced by a graphical natural-frequency format, as op-
posed to either a numerical natural-frequency or a probabil-
ity format. Specifically, the effect of the Bayes-consistency
of a conclusion on the ratings of the reasonableness of that
conclusion was greatest in the graphical natural-frequency
condition. There was clear evidence of a graphical advan-
tage that was not attributable to the fact that the graphical
format was also a natural-frequency format.
A potential explanation for this finding is that, beyond ex-
plicating the natural frequencies, the present graphical for-
mat (see the illustration in Figure 5) served to organize the
frequencies into nested sets (i.e., sets within sets; see Barbey
& Sloman, 2007, for a discussion), that help the decision
maker conceptualize probabilities (in the form of propor-
tions) and natural frequencies simultaneously. The graphical
bar in Figure 5 is divided into four sections, with the width
of each section indicating a natural frequency. However, the
same graphic is divisible into two larger sections that help
explicate a pair of probabilities. There is a left section that
indicates the frequency of women who are carrying a single
fetus, but that also shows the proportion of those women di-
agnosed as carrying twins (the size relationship between the
left section—which consists of the concatenation of the first
and second sections — and the second section). Likewise,
the left section of the graphic shows not just the frequency
of women carrying twins but also the proportion of those
women diagnosed as carrying a single fetus.
In summary, the present findings demonstrate the exis-
tence of belief biases in evaluating the rationality of others:
There was a bias to consider information that could not have
been available to the person being evaluated. The present
findings also showed that the responsiveness of assessed ra-
tionality to the Bayes consistency of another person’s conclu-
sion was greater with a graphical frequency format than with
either a numerical frequency or a probability format. This re-
sult was interpreted to indicate a facilitatory role for nested-
set representation, and particularly for icon-based graphic
representation, in Bayesian judgment.
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